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THE MEANING OF "HOOTCH, MOONSHINE, CORN
WHISKEY" IN THE MISSOURI PROHIBITION LAW
Even before the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution the various constituent commonwealths of the Union possessed, as a part
of the so-called police power, the right to pass statutes regulating or prohibiting
the manufacture, transportation, and sale of intoxicating liquors., The Eighteenth
Amendment itself in general terms declared that the transportation, importation,
exportation, manufacture, and sale of such liquors should be prohibited. It is
beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss in detail the jural effects of this
amendment. It is sufficient for our present purpose to say that it laid upon the
government of both the Federal Union and the states the duty of passing some ade-
quate legislation to make criminal the act of a person dealing in the prohibited man-
ner with any species of intoxicants. The amendment did not itself make such deal-
1. Mugler v. Kansas, (1887), 123 U. S. 623, 8' Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L Ed. 205.
2. The words of the amendment are:
"Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into,
or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territories subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The congress and the several states shall have concurrent power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This Article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been rati-
fied as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislature of the several states
as provided in the Constitution within seven years of the date of the submission
hereof to the states by the congress."
3. Exception to this statement has been taken by certain friends who have done me
the honor to discuss this part of the article. It is said that the amendment placed no duty
upon either the state or federal governments in respect to the passage of enforcement leg-
islation. The theory as stated is about as follows: The Constitution contains a grant of
power by the states to the federal government. (The states are entities which existed be-
fore their creature the United States, and which are themselves sovereign, or at least the
primary repository of power coming from the sovereign people). The states had always had
the power to regulate and deal with the liquor traffic even to the extent of prohibiting it.
(Mugler v. Kansas supra, note 1). The federal government, possessing only enumerated
powers, (Const. U.S. Amd. X, Kansas v. Colorado, (1907), 206 U. S. 46, 51 L Ed. 951;
McCullock v. Maryland, (1819), 4 Wheat. 316, 4L. Ed. 519; Collectorv. Day, (1870), 11 Wall.
113, 20 L. Ed. 122) had no power to prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquor. The
amendment therefore merely served to create in congress a new power -the power to pro-
hibit dealing in intoxicating liquors. As an argument for this position it is asserted that
there is no means of coercing the state legislature (nor for that matter congress) into pass-
ing enforcement legislation and hence they cannot be said to be under a duty to enact such
legislation.
It is believed that this argument is unsound. Particularly is this true if the nature
of law as understood by students of modern jurisprudence is borne in mind. Long ago the
physical sciences gave up the idea that "natural laws" were immutable principles for the
governance of the universe. Instead, natural laws are seen only to be generalized state-
ments descriptive of past observed phenomena upon the basis of which some future phenom-
enon lying within the same narrow field may with a certain degree of probability be pre-
dicted. Now the social sciences under the lead of behavioristic psychology have taken a
similar position. (Watson, Behaviorism (1926) p. 6; Meyer, The Fundamental Laws of Hu-
man Behavior. (1911); Chaps. 1 and 17. See also Bernard The Transition to an Ojectire
Standard of Social Contract Chap. 1
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ing criminal. I. e., it did not direct the agencies of government charged with handling
the problem of crime to treat as criminal, persons who manufactured, sold, or trans-
ported the prohibited liquors. It fixed no punishment for such persons. The details
in this respect of prohibition enforcement were left to the national and state legis-
latures with power in each to act concurrently.
It is obviously within the power of a legislative body in fulfilling its duty to
enact enforcement legislation, to create different classes of intoxicants, and to pun-
ish differently persons dealing with these different classes. E. g., it would be possible
to punish as a misdemeanor the sale of liquor containing more than one and less
than five percent of alcohol by volume, and to punish as a felony the sale of liquor
containing more than five per cent of alcohol.
The legislature of the State of Missouri, in performance of the duty thus con-
stitutionally imposed upon it, has enacted three state enforcement acts.' The orig-
inal act of 1919 was not expressly repealed by that of 1921, and the act of 1923 did
not purport to repeal either that of 1919 or that of 1921. Each of these three acts,
then, in so far as it is not in direct conflict with the terms of later legislation, is still
in force. 6 The original act of 1919 defined intoxicating liquors as spiritous, malt,
or vinous liquors containing more than one half of one per cent of ethyl alcohol by
volume which were "potable and fit for beverage purposes", and this definition
still stands. The act of 1921, by a section which still is in force, made the possession,
The modern jurists who twenty-five years ago had discarded the outworn notions of
Blackstone and Austin, that law was a sovereign command, (Lowell, The Limits of Sovereign-
ty, (1889), 2 Harvard Law Review 70), have come to look upon the rules with which they
deal as merely formulae descriptive of past observed behavior of certain members of society
whom we choose to call state officers, upon the basis of which we may sometimes predict
their future actions. (Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, American Bar Association Jotr-
nal, July, 1927, lb. The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conffict of Laws, (1923), 33 Yale
Law Journal 45). Bingham, What is the Law, (1912), 11 Mich. Law Rev. I and 109. Cf.
Baumstark, Was ist das Recht.) Now it is plain that state legislative and executive officers
do ordinarily act in such a manner that they appear constrained by rules of constitutional
and international law, even where no physical restraint could be imposed upon them. Hence
they can be said clearly to be under duties, and, if we choose to use the metaphysical and
fictional term "the state" as representing a conceptual personification of politically organ.
ized society, we can say that this imaginary creature too is the servus of duties and other
jural litigations, (See Duguit, Law and the State, (1918), 31 Harvard Law Review 1, also
his Le Droit Constitutionnel. Kocourek, Jural Relations, (1927), p. 154.)
As we have seen, the first section of the amendment "prohibits" the manufacture,
sale, and transportation of liquor. This clearly does more than create a power in the federal
congress. It is meant to create duties in someone. Yet it is clear that these duties can never
become real ones (or to use Kocourek's phrase zygnomic) unless some statute is passed to
create sanctions for them; for without such statute there can be no governmental action
against violators, and hence no real rule of law and no jural relationships (law and jural
relationships being as we have shown dependent on the action of societal agents). In the
second section, congress is given power, and the states are left with powers, of which the grant
to congress might have deprived them but for the words of the constitutional provision.
This was done with the sole purpose that sanctions might be provided for the duties created
by Section 1. Hence these sections created, both as to the states and the federal congress,
both powers and duties in respect to the same subject matter. These relations are, as
Kocourek would say, conjunctive congruent ones. Op Cit. p. 105.
4. Art. 7 Chapter 52 R. S. Mo. 1919; Act of March 28, 1921, Laws of 1921 p. 413
et sec.; Act of April 3, 1923, Laws of 1923 p. 236; (both of the later acts are set out in 1927
Supplement to R. S. Mo. at 208 et sec.).
5. See e. g. State v. Clark, (1927), 289 S. W. 963.
6. Section 6602 R. S. Mo. 1919.
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transportation, gift, manufacture, or sale of any intoxicating liquor, as so defined,
a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment in the county jail or both. 7 The
act of 1923, however, attempted to punish more severely dealing in certain specified
kinds of intoxicants thought to be more dangerous to the public health and safety
than the general run of such liquors. Section 20 of that act provided that the maker
or seller of "hootch, moonshine, corn whiskey, or other intoxicating liquor" which
caused the death of any person, or caused insanity or blindness, should be punished
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of from two years to life.
Section 21, with which we are here more particularly concerned, provided that:
"If any person shall manufacture, make, brew, distill, sell, give away or transport
any hootch," "moonshine," corn whiskey," shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon
conviction thereof, punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period
of not less than two years nor more than five years, or by either a fine of $500.00 or
imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not less than three months nor
more than twelve months, or both. Provided: That this section shall not apply in
the case of corn whiskey lawfully manufactured, transported, or sold."
It will be noticed that the language of this section follows that of section 20, save
and except that section 21 omits the words "or other intoxicating liquors." a The
fact that the legislature used the terms "hootch, moonshine, corn whiskey" without
connecting them or any of them by means of a conjunction of any kind, coupled
with the fact that at least two of these words, 'hootch' and 'moonshine', have as
yet no scientific definition, makes the construction of the section difficult.
Difficult as it is, however, it is a problem of the greatest practical importance.
Altho as yet no cases under section 20 have reached the Supreme Court of the state,
and as far as we have been able to learn, no cases under this section have been tried
in the state, a very large percentage of liquor cases are brought under section 21. Al-
most every term of court in most of the counties of the state sees the trial of one or
more cases under this section, but as yet the courts are at a loss properly to define
the terms therein used.
For the lawyer, the fact that the terms used in the statute are not ones to which
the science of chemistry has hitherto given an exact definition is of little importance.
Terms used in stating a legal proposition (statutory or otherwise) aremere mathemat-
ical symbols which stand for certain fact situations in the physical world.9 So long
as it is reasonably clear to everyone concerned just what fact situations are denoted
by the terms used, the rules will serve their practical purpose of enabling us to pre-
dict the future action of courts and other state officers within the field dealt with.
On the other hand, particularly when we are dealing with a criminal statue, it is
highly desirable that the courts so definitely define the terms employed in the act
that everyone affected can with reasonable certainty tell what acts are within and
what without the terms of its prohibition. Yet any attempt at a prior definition
even in the field of criminal law is dangerous. Here as in the realm of constitutional
7. Laws of 1921, p. 414; 1927 Sup. p. 281.
8. It may be possible that the legislature intended to include the whole phrase in Sec-
tion 21 and that thru a clerical error the last portion of it was omitted. This would, how-
ever, seem improbable.
9. See the discussion of the usefulness and meaning of terms in Sturges and Clark
Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages (1928) 37 Yale L Jour. 691, citing Whitehead,
Symbolism its meaning and Effect (1927) 26, Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (1927) 53, Ogden
and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1927) 42.
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law it is best for terms to be defined by the gradual process of "judicial inclusion and
exclusion". Our problem of construcion then resolves itself in to this: under the
actual holdings of the courts, what kinds of intoxicating liquor are to be deemed
included within the prohibition of the statute, and what kinds are held not to be
hootch, moonshine and corn whiskey. Our attempt to solve this problem will be
based upon a purely inductive study of the decisions. Before attempting such a
study it will be well for us to analyze the factual problem. We must see just what
kinds of intoxicating liquors are ordinarily met with in the work of prohibition
enforcement. We can then ask, in the light of the actual decisions of the courts,
which of these fall within the prohibited class.
The toxic quality of liquors dealt with in prohibition enforcement is due to the
fact that they contain ethyl alcohol. They are all what are known as alcoholic
liquors. Now ethyl alcohol which is to be used as a beverage is produced generally
by what is known as a process of fermentation. The prime materials for this process
are various forms of vegetable matter such as corn, rye, potatoes, fruit juice, rice,
etc. This vegetable matter contains the organic compound known as starch which
can be broken down by chemical action into various sugars. These sugars in turn
will be converted by the actions of certain rather obscure organic substances called
enzyms, into ethyl alcohol and carbon dioxide.10 In the case of a number of alcoholic
beverages, this process of fermentation, together with filtering, straining etc., com-
pletes the course of manufacture. Such liquors are known as fermented or brewed
liquors, and contain a comparatively small per cent of ethyl alcohol (3o to 15%0)."1
When a higher alcoholic content is desired the liquor must be treated by the
further process of distillation. The fermented liquor is placed in a container and heat-
ed to a point a little higher than 780 centigrade (the boiling point of ethyl alcohol).
The alcohol is vaporized, passing off at the top of the container or still, thru what is
generally known as a goose neck, whence it is led thru a copper coil or worm, where
it is cooled and condensed again into liquid form. The resulting liquor is comparatively
rich in ethyl alcohol (50% of alcohol in bonded whiskey and from 30o to 60o in
illegally made whiskey).12
The distilled liquors dealt with again are of two varieties. First, there are lawful-
ly produced liquors which have either been made in a government inspected distillery
and then diverted to unlawful uses or unlawfully imported to this country from
abroad. Second, there are vast quantities of distilled liquors produced illegally in
this country for the bootleg trade.
10. The statement in the text is slightly inaccurate in the case of liquor made from fruit.
Where liquor is made from corn or other grain the starch which this grain contains is corn-
bined with water to produce maltose and dextrine. The maltose is then converted into
ethyl alcohol and carbon dioxide. The process thus involves two steps represented by the
following equations: (1) 3C6H,0Os + H20 = C12H.O 15 + C6H 006 anti (2) CI2H22O1 +
H20 = 4C2HbOH + 4CO 2. In the case of fruit only the latter process is gone through
with, here fruit sugar or fructose breaks down directly into ethyl alcohol and carbon dioxile
the equation being C6H1206 = 2C2HtOH + 2CO2. These two different processes shown
in equations (1) and (2) are brought about by two different enzymes. The first, known as
diastase, which is found in the sprouting grain itself, produces the change from starch to
maltose, while the latter, known as zymase, and which is secreted by the yeast plant, pro-
duces the change from maltose or other forms of sugar to alcohol ankl carbon dioxide.
This difference in the process of the formation of alcohol in grain mash and in fruit juices may
possibly account for the difference in the number and amount of secondary constituents
present in fruit whiskey as distinguished from grain whiskey.
11. Wine, 8 to 16 7; beer, 3.5 to 4.5%.
12. Molinari, Industrial Chemistry, (1913) 11, p. 132 et sec.
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The illegally distilled liquor differs considerably in chemical composition from
the legally distilled liquor. The former contains a larger percentage of certain sub-
stances which are produced in the process of fermentation along with the ethyl
alcohol, among others fusil oil,"3 the various aldehydes, and other organic compounds.
For this reason, and because of the unsanitary methods of manufacture, it has been
noted that the toxicity of illegally produced liquors is about twice as great as that
of legal liquors.14
There are in some instances slight differences in chemical composition, physical
properties and biological reactions as between liquors produced from corn, rye,
fruit, and other various prime materials.5 These differences are comparatively hard
to detect. The principal classification then is into liquors which are only fermented
or brewed and those which are distilled, the latter class being subdivided into legally
and illegally distilled liquors. In our discussion, then, we shall attempt to determine
which of these kinds of liquors come within the class denoted by the terms, "hootch,
moonshine, corn whiskey".
Certain questions obviously occur when the language of the statute is considered.
The legislature, as we have seen, failed to use a conjuction of any kind between the
last members of the series "hootch, moonshine, corn whiskey". What conjunction
is to be understood? Are the words to be taken as synonymous? If they are, does
this mean that the liquor meant to be designated thereby must invariably be made
from corn? If not, what is the difference between "hootch" and "moonshine" on
the one hand and "corn whiskey" on the other? Is the sale of all whiskey made from
corn, without regard to the legality of its manufacture, made a felony by the act?
I.
The statutes of other states bear little resemblance to our own in this regard.
Little help is therefore to be expected from an examination of their decisions. In
point of fact, some three or four cases have discussed incidentally the meaning of
the term moonshine. In two cases in MontanatG and one in North Carolina,n
the courts have defined moonshine as whiskey which has been illegally made. These
cases are of value only as establishing the general doctrine that illegality of manufac-
ture is one of the necessary elements which must be present before a given liquor is
to be classified as moonshine. But they do not attempt to define whiskey, this
having been unnecessary to the decision. In like manner, the general dictionaries
of the English language had for many years defined moonshine as illegally distilled
spirits. Little help is to be gotten from such definitions.
13. Fusil oil is a mixture of propyl alcohol CaHrO, isobutyl alcohol 2CH, CH. CH.OH,
and amyl alcohol C5HnOH.
All whiskey contains some fusil oil and it has been shown that this fusil oil increases
rather than decreases with age. Yet it remains true that in illegal whiskey in the manu-
facture of which "fractional distillation" is never used, and which is produced by the most
careless methods, the percentage of fusil oil is much greater than in bonded whiskey. The
percentages in various kinds of bonded whiskeys are given in Woodman, Food .dnalyfis.(1915) P. 474. The statements given in regard to the analysis of moonshine whiskey are
based upon analysis made of moonshine taken in raids by the sheriff of Marion County
during the prohibition period. The work was done by Mr. Leonard Rubison, chemist, of
Hannibal, Missouri, who has also looked over the portions of this article dealing with chem-
ical questions.
14. Fisher, Prohibition at its Worst, (1926) p. 28.
15. E. g., fusil oil seems generally to be lacking in liquors produced from fruit.
16. State v. Sedlaeck, 239 Pac. 1002; State v. Chareth 242 Pac. 343, 75 Mont. 78.
17. State v. Tuter, 131 N. C. 701, 42 S. E. 443, see also JVJller v. State, 132 Ad. 624,
150 Md. 278.
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II.
Our real task therefore must be the analysis of the Missouri cases. The judicial
construction of the act starts with the decision of State v. Brown's, in June 1924,
slightly less than a year after the act took effect.19 The opinion of the court in that
case was written by Judge White. The information filed in the court below had
charged that the defendant did feloniously sell certain moonshine. This information
was attacked in the upper court on two grounds: (1) that the act under which it was
drawn was unconstitutional; and (2) that the information failed to state that the
moonshine sold was intoxicating liquor. A discussion of the definition of moonshine
was not therefore directly necessary to the decision. In a sense, much that was
said about moonshine may be considered as obiter dictum. Yet as the case had for
a long time a very considerable influence on future decisions, the court's language
must be noted. Judge White says, speaking of the three terms used in the section,
"These words not being connected by a disjunctive or a conjunctive, must be taken
as synonymous; hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey are different expressions de-
scribing the same kind of liquor." Again he says, "Legally, "moonshine" in context
like the language of the information, has as definite a significance as the term whiskey.
It means liquor manufactured illegally." This last remark seems to be directly in
point and a part of the reasoning on which the decision was actually based. It is
therefore to be given more weight than the obviously obiter remark about the terms
being synonymous.
In State v. Gatlin,"0 the information had charged the felonious transportation
of "corn whiskey", and the evidence was to the effect that defendant had transported
whiskey. The Court properly held that the defendant's demurrer to the evidence
should have been sustained. The case merely stands for the proposition that there
are other kinds of whiskey than corn whiskey. It does not tend to support the dicta
in the Brown case, and would be law no matter what view is taken of the relation
between the terms "corn whiskey" and "moonshine" as used in Section 21.
In the case State v. Combs2I, the information merely charged sale of"moonshine".
The evidence as to the kind of liquor sold came from a chemist. He stated that it was
a distilled liquor containing 62 per cent of ethyl alcohol by volume, that it was potable
and that it "could be designated as moonshine'. Defendant filed a motion to quash
the information on the ground that section 21 was unconstitutional as being so vague
and uncertain in meaning that it constituted a denial of due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not appear from the report of the decision
whether or not he filed a demurrer to the evidence or requested a directed verdict,
but he offered no evidence on his own behalf. From a verdict of guilty he appealed
alleging as error the failure of the trial court to sustain his motion to quash. In the
Supreme Court counsel for the defendant argued that the words of the statute, "if
any person shall make ......... any hootch, moonshine, corn whiskey, shall be guilty of
a felony," could only be construed to mean that, whenever any person made or sold
moonshine, then in that event corn whiskey would be guilty of a felony; and that this
being an absurd proposition of law, the statute was so indefinite as to constitute
a denial of due process.
The court held that the word "or" must be understood between the word
,'moonshine" and the words "corn whiskey"; that with this addition it is plain that
the statute means to punish only a natural person and is sufficiently plain in its mean-
18. (1924) 262 S. W. 710, 304 Mo. 78.
19. The Act took effect June 3, 1923..
20. (1924) 267 S. W. 797.
21. (1925) 273 S. W. 1037.
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ing. The court does not discuss what moonshine may be, and by inference holds
that the evidence in regard to the nature of the liquor sold is sufficient. The construc-
tion placed on the section seems somewhat out of harmony with the theory that the
three terms are synonymous.
In Hull's2 case, decided the same day as the Combs case, the court merely de-
cided that Section 21 did not repeal the first section of the act of 1921 punishing
as a misdemeanor the sale of any kind of intoxicating liquor. By inference it held
that, as moonshine is intoxicating liquor, the illicit vendor of this substance may be
prosecuted either for a felony under Section 21 of the act of 1923 or for a misdemeanor
under Section 1 of the act of 1921.
In December of the same year, the court decided three cases, all reported in 279
S. W., which made a distinctly new contribution to our understanding of the terms
here under discussion. State v. Griffthu was a prosecution for manufacture of "in-
toxicating liquor commonly called 'hootch', 'moonshine', 'corn whiskey". The in-
formation and instructions of the trial court were attacked. In discussing the pro-
priety of the information, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Judge Walker, said
that hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey mentioned in Section 21 were merely
kinds of intoxicating liquor as generally defined in the previous legislation. That
"their meaning is familiar to anyone of general intelligence as designating intoxi-
cating liquor illicitly distilled for beverage purposes. (Our italics) An instruction
defining intoxicating liquor, and requiring the jury to find that the defendant
manufactured "intoxicating liquor commonly called 'hootch' 'moonshine' or 'corn
whiskey' ", was proper, and that it was unnecessary for the trial court in his instruc-
tions to define these terms. The court stated that in its definition of the terms it was
expressly modifying the definition given in the Brown case.
In the Morris' case, the same form of information was used and again held
valid. The trial court had here given an instruction defining the terms in contro-
versy. This instruction was as follows:
"The court instructs you that the words 'hootch', 'moonshine', 'corn whiskey' mean
intoxicating liquor manufactured illegally, that is to say, without lawful permission
from the United States government and without lawful permission from the state
government."
In commenting on this instruction, Judge Higbee says that it is in harmony with
State v. Brown" and State v. Combs." The evidence in the case had been that the
defendant had made "moonshine whiskey". There was no evidence that the whiskey
was made from corn. While therefore purporting to follow State v. Brown the case
is clearly inconsistent with the theory of that case to the effect that the three terms
under consideration are synonymous.
The opinion in State v. .Pinto7 was written by Judge White who had spoken
for the court in Brown's case. Defendant was charged with the felonious manufac-
ture of "corn whiskey". In instruction numbered three, the trial court told the jury
that defendant was charged with manufacturing intoxicating liquor illegally.
In the next instruction however, he attempted to define corn whiskey. He said that
the manufacture of corn whiskey was "the commingling of some ingredients with
corn in some form so that the process of fermentation will take place and a potable
22. (1925) 273 S. W. 1039.
23. (1925) 279 S. W. 135.
24. (1925) 279 S. NV. 141.
25. Supra, Note 18.
26. Supra, Note 21.
27. (1925) 279 S. W. 144.
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beverage containing more than one half of one per cent of alcohol will be the final
result thereof." These instructions were attacked as not properly defining "corn
whiskey". In holding them improper, Judge White argued that the manufacture
of "corn whiskey" denounced by Section 21 did not include all kinds of illegally
manufactured liquor. "By corn whiskey was undoubtedly meant a liquor entirely
distinct from those synthetic liquors which are made from alcohol whether reclaimed
or otherwise." Again: "In the case of State v. Brown we attempted to define 'moon-
shine' which has caused some misunderstanding and confusion, because the definition
of 'moonshine' has been applied to 'corn whiskey'. On further consideration of the
matter, in view of the provisions above referred to, we are convinced that we were
wrong in holding the terms 'hootch', 'moonshine' and 'corn whiskey' to be synony-
mous. From the well-known use of those terms, it is probable that the word 'or'
should be understood between 'hootch' and 'corn whiskey' as they appear in Section
20 (sic) of the Act of 1923. As a matter of common knowledge, moonshine is a
name applied to other liquors than corn whiskey. It is a broader term, and includes
the corn whiskey denounced by the statute. The same may be said of 'hootch'.
That is what we should have said in the Brown case as our understanding of the
legislative intent. .ll illegal corn whiskey is moonshine, but all moonshine is not corn
whiskey." (Our italics).
So far, the court's position seems reasonably clear. Yet in the next paragraph
the learned Justice seems again to becloud the issue a little when he says:
"Therefore corn whiskey must be whiskey, not some other kind of liquor; it must
be made of corn, or a product of corn must be an ingredient of its composition.
The fact that the Legislature chose to call it also moonshine does not enlarge the content
of the term 'corn whiskey'. If the lawmakers, as further descriptive of it, had used
the definitive and well understood term 'white mule', probably less doubt would
have arisen over the kind of liquor meant."
If, as stated in the preceding paragraph, the terms are not used as synonymous,
then the legislature did not call corn whiskey moonshine but merely denounced an
offense which could be committed in two (or rather more than two) different ways;
i. e. by the manufacture or sale of moonshine, or by the manufacture or sale of corn
whiskey. The last paragraph of the opinion seems, however, 'to make clear the court's
position and to declare emphatically that the terms refer to different liquors:
"We are not called upon now to define the terms 'hootch' and 'moonshine',
because they are applied in this case, and in all other cases where the matter has
come before us, to 'corn whiskey'. If those terms are applied to some other alcoholic
drink in a case that may come before us, it will be time enough to define them."
The decision in State v. Brock2s merely reiterated the doctrine of the Griffith
case as to the sufficiency of an information, and further held that evidence that a
witness "supposed" that the liquor in question was "commonly called moonshine"
was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The case adds little to the development of
the law.
In February 1926, the court took a definite forward step in clearing up the law.
The opinion in the case of State v. Wvright9 was written by Commissioner Railey.
This opinion was adopted by division two as the opinion of the court; but a separate
opinion was filed by Judges White and Blair, so that only Judge Walker and Com-
missioner Higbee can be said to have concurred in the reasoning of the principal
opinion. The defendant was charged under the statute with the manufacture of
28. (1926) 280 S. W. 48.
29. (1926) 280 S. W. 703.
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"white corn whiskey". The proof was to the effect that he manufactured "whiskey".
Defendant objected that there was a fatal variance between the pleading and the
proof. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Judge Railey argued that the
court would take judicial notice that whiskey was an intoxicating liquor and was
potable and fit for beverage purposes. That the words 'hootch', 'moonshine',
'white mule', etc., are generally used in connection with the unlawful manufacture
of whiskey". That therefore an information which merely charged the unlawful or
felonious manufacture of whiskey necessarily charged the manufacture of moonshine
and accused defendant of a felony under the law. Therefore the proof of the manu-
facture of "whiskey" alone without showing that the whiskey was "white corn
whiskey" was sufficient. He cited with approval the portion of the opinion in the
Pinto case which modified the definition given in the Brown case. At first glance,
it would seem that the ruling in the WVright case was inconsistent with the actual
holding of the court in Pinto's case. The concurring opinion of White, J., who had
spoken for the court in the Pinto case, discloses a ground on which the two decisions
may be reconciled. He points out that, since under the opinion of Railey, C. the
unlawful manufacture of corn whiskey and the unlawful manufacture of any other
kind of whiskey would constitute a felony under Section 21, there was, in the case
then before the court, only a variance in the manner of the commission of the crime
between the information and the evidence. As this variance was not a material one
in the instant case, and the question was now raised after verdict, it was cured by the
Statute of Jeofails. While White J. does not discuss his opinion in the Pinto case
it is clear that the point there was more than one of variance and that it was an error
and inaccuracy in instruction.
Nevertheless, one is forced to ask if this distinction is not in reality one of formal
logic rather than of substance. If the variance between 'corn whiskey' alleged in an
information and 'rye whiskey', let us say, established in the proof is not material,
why would an error in instructions, which at most might cause the jury to confuse
corn whiskey with some other kind of whiskey and find defendant guilty when he
manufactured some species of whiskey other than that made from corn, be material?
We are inclined to the belief that the actual holdings in the Pinto and WVright cases
are inconsistent and that the latter case overruled the former.
In May 1926, the Brown case, having been retried to a jury who found the
defendant guilty a second time, came back to the Supreme Court. 0 This time
the conviction was affirmed. The greater part of the opinion is taken up with a dis-
cussion of the admissibility of certain evidence. Concerning the question here under
discussion, the court stated:
"We think the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The witness testified
that he bought the pint of moonshine whiskey from the defendant, and paid him$1.50 for it; that it looked, smelled, and tasted like moonshine; and that it was moon-
shine whiskey; and that it made him drunk. This was sufficient to warrant thejuryin finding that it was moonshine and was intoxicating. State v. .Pigg (Mo. Supp.
278 S. W. 1030, 8).
"Judge White said in his opinion:
"Legally 'moonshine' in a context, like the language of the information, has as defi-
nite significance as the term 'whiskey'. It means liquor manufactured illegally'.
State v. Brown, 304 Mo. 78, 262 S. W. 710".
The learned Commissioner here quoted from Judge Railey's opinion in the Yrighlu
case the remarks about the statute prohibiting all forms of manufacture of whiskey
30. (1926) 285 S. AV. 995.
31. Supra, Note 29.
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whether the whiskey involved was "corn whiskey", "rye whiskey", or whiskey made
from some other material. He then goes on to state that this ruling under Section 21
clearly applied to Section 20. In point of fact, the information in the case before the
court seems to have been drawn under Section 21 and not Section 20, but this does
not seriously affect the reasoning of the court's opinion. It stands as a clear affirmance
of its position in the Wright case.
State v. Black-1a seems expressly to overrule the decision in the I into case, in
so far as the latter relates to the necessity of proving the sale of 'corn whiskey'
rather than any other kind of 'moonshine' under an information charging 'corn
whiskey'. The information in the Black case alleged that defendant sold one Dan
Denver Ball a half pint of "hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey". In instruction
numbered one, the trial court, after requiring the jury to find that the defendant
sold "a quantity of hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey", proceeded to define these
terms by saying that they meant illegally manufactured whiskey. To this instruc-
tion exception was taken for the reason, among others, that it permitted the jury
to convict defendant even tho they should find that he sold some kind of illegally
manufactured whiskey not made from corn. The Supreme Court, however, in an
opinion by Judge Higbee, concurred in by the entire division, held that the instruc-
tion was good and affirmed the defendant's conviction. The Wright case and the
second opinion in the Brown case were cited with approval, and the Pinto case was
not mentioned. The question was identical with that upon which the conviction
of Pinto had been reversed, and the case came up in exactly the same way.
In State v. J/espern the information charged that the defendant had feloniously
made and distilled "hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey". It was proved that he
had made an intoxicating liquor by redistilling some rubbing alcohol. Rubbing
alcohol seems to be a kind of denatured alcohol. By this is meant that it is ethyl
alcohol into which certain non-potable or poisonous substances have been placed
in order that it may not be used for beverage purposes. As a matter of fact, many
different prime materials are used for the commercial production of ethyl alcohol, and
it was of course impossible to say that the original rubbing alcohol had in it any in-
gredient produced from corn. Defendant contended that he should have been indicted
under Section 5 and not under Section 21. Section 4 of the act punishes the redis-
tilling of denatured alcohol. The court held that, altho a prosecution might have
been brought under Section 4, the same acts constituted a violation of Section 21
as well. The conviction was upheld. Judge Blair in delivering the opinion of the
court said, "an intoxicating liquor illegally distilled for beverage purposes is hootch,
moonshine, or corn whiskey."
In State v. Bryant33, the evidence showed that defendant had made a distilled
intoxicating liquor out of sugar, shorts, and yeast. It was not in evidence what kind
of "shorts" were meant; that is whether they were made from corn meal or other
grain. Yet the court without hesitation upheld a conviction for manufacture of
"hootch, moonshine, and corn whiskey".
State v. Clark34 was decided by the Springfield Court of Appeals, the opinion be-
ing written by Judge Bradley. The charge was under the first section of the Act of.
1921. The proof showed transportation of "moonshine whiskey". The court however
held that moonshine whiskey was only a kind of intoxicating liquor, and hence, while
if the state chose to do so the person guilty of transporting it could be prosecuted
31a. (1927) 289 S. W. 804.
32. (1927) 289 S. W. 862.
33. (1927) 289 S. W. 938.
34. (1927) 289 S. W. 963.
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for a felony, yet at the election of the state he could be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.
State v. Martinn held that where a defendant is charged with selling "moonshine
corn whiskey" it is sufficient if the court in his instructions defines "corn whiskey",
since corn whiskey as used in the statute is only a kind of moonshine, and the descrip-
tive word "moonshine", as used as an adjective qualifying "corn whiskey," is redun-
dant.
The latest case we have been able to find is that of State v. Cook.zs Error was
assigned on failure of the trial court in his instructions to define "hootch, moonshine
and corn whiskey". The evidence was to the effect that defendant had sold a liquor
which witnesses described variously as "moonshine" and "corn whiskey". No
attempt was made by the trial court to define these terms at all. The conviction was
sustained, the court speaking thru Judge Walker saying that these terms had a mean-
ing well known to everyone and a definition of them was unnecessary. The learned
Judge added that the court had frequently held that the terms, hootch, moonshine,
and corn whiskey referred to "spiritous liquor, illegally distilled or manufactured."
To this definition may be added that spiritous liquors in common parlance mean
distilled liquors as distinguished from those which are merely the product of fermen-
tation or brewing.
We are now in a position to sum up the law as it exists today. We shall attempt
to answer the questions set out at the beginning of our discussion. It seems clear
that the word "or" must be understood between the word "moonshine" and the
words "corn whiskey" used in the statute.37 The words are not to be understood as
synonymous, but the terms hootch and moonshine are to be taken as general terms
designating a large class or genus of intoxicating liquors of which corn whiskey is
but a single species. The statute makes it a felony to sell any kind of moonshine.
This felony may be committed in several ways by the sale of the various kinds of
moonshine, and among the others of corn whiskey. -8 It seems that at least after
verdict, a variance between the allegation of a sale or transportation or manufacture
of one kind of moonshine, e. g., of corn whiskey, and the proof of the sale of some
other kind of moonshine, will not be a fatal one.32
We have left however the question of just what liquors are included within
the scope of the term moonshine. Let us examine in detail the status of each of the
three general classes of alcoholic intoxicating liquors enumerated above. No case
has been before the court in which a fermented liquor or brewed liquor, such as wine,
cider, or beer e. g., as distinguished from a distilled liquor, has been involved.
There is, therefore, certainly no authority for including such liquors in the class
of moonshine. On the other hand, while there is no positive authority for excluding
them, the language of the courts in almost all of the cases is to the effect that
moonshine must be a distilled liquor. 0 Such a decision accords with common practice
among the prosecutors and law enforcement officers generally. It also accords with
common sense as we shall see later.
The authorities are clear that to be classed as moonshine, distilled liquor must
have been illegally made. 1 This excludes the so called "bonded" whiskey or whiskey
35. (1927) 292 S. NV. 39.
36. 3 S. W. (2nd) 365.
37. State v. Combs, supra Note 21.
38. State v. Pinto. supra Note 27.
39. State v. Wright, supra note 20.
40. State v. Black, supra note 31a.
41. State v. Sedlaeck, State v. Chareth, supra note 16, State P. Tuten, elFller v. State,
supra note 17, State v. Brown, supra note 18, State v. Wright, supra note 29, State v. Pinto,
supra, note 27, State v. Vesper, supra, note 31, State v. Cook supra, note 36.
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legally made in government inspected distilleries and illegally diverted to prohibited
uses, and also legally manufactured foreign whiskey and distilled liquors which
have been unlawfully imported into the United States.
On the other hand, the decisions are expressly to the effect that distilled spirits
not made from corn, and in fact not made from any grain at all, are nevertheless, if
illegally manufactured, moonshine.2 Seemingly all illegally distilled spirits are included
in the prohibited class withoutregard to the prime materials used in their production5
In all sciences, too broad generalizations are dangerous. This is particularly
true in the field of jurisprudence. Yet it may not be wholly amiss to attempt to
formulate a general definition upon the basis of our inductive study of the cases-
a general rule which, like all rules of law, will be merely a short-hand formula de-
scriptive of past observed phenomena, upon the basis of which we can with a fair
degree of accuracy predict future phenomena in the same limited field. That
definition may be stated as follows: Hootch or moonshine, as those terms are used
in the prohibition act of 1923 are distilled intoxicating liquors which contain more
than one half of one percent of ethyl alcohol by volume, and are potable and fit
for beverage purposes, and which have been manufactured without a permit from
the government of the United States and the government of the State, regardless
of the materials used in their production.
III
Let us subject the rule thus formulated by inductive study of the cases to the
test of pragmatic logic. Does it work? The pragmatic test suggested will be twofold.
First, does the rule as stated give the statute such a meaning that this section when
applied will tend to secure valuable social results? Does this construction of the act
make it possible to enforce it as a matter of practical criminal law administration?
To put the whole matter more concretely, does the classification of the offense of
selling liquor which makes it a felony to sell illegally distilled liquor and only a
misdemeanor to sell legally distilled liquor or brewed or fermented liquor (either
legal or illegal), accord with a socially and economically sound public policy?
Second, if this construction is established will it be practically possible under or-
dinary circumstances for a prosecuting attorney to prove that liquor sold is moon-
shine and thus secure a conviction of the defendant?
(a). There may be some doubt as to the wisdom of providing such drastic
punishments as those included in Section 21. This doubt arises from the fact thatjuries are slow to convict when the punishment is too severe." Yet the wisdom of
42. State v. Vesper, supra note 31; State v. Bryant, supra, note 33.
43. State v. Cook, supra note 36.
44. In the rural portions of Missouri and in the smaller cities there is a fairly high
percentage of convictions in liquor cases as compared with all kinds of felonies. Felony
liquor cases, 25.767o, all felonies 33%. In the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City however,
the percentage of convictions in felony liquor cases is only 1.81%. However, a large number
of liquor cases which start off as felony charges, are disposed of an pleas of guilty to included
charges of misdemeanor.- In St. Louis during the period covered by the Crime Survey, 145
out of 155 felony liquor cases were disposed of in this way. In Jackson County, 257 out of
306. (Missouri Crim. Survey, p. 302 et see). The greater part of prohibition enforcement
in the cities is left to the federal government, and under the federal code only the most im-
portant cases can be made felonies. It would seem therefore that experience in the cities
shows that liquor cases cannot be disposed of as felonies, and that there is great reluctance
on the part of juries to send persons charged with liquor violations to the penitentiary. In
the experience of the writer, at Hannibal, a city of some 25,000 population, this has proven
true. Juries who will acquit where a charge is brought under a felony section, will convict if
the charge is under a misdemeanor section. Of course the case is different in purely rural
counties.
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punishing the seller of illegally distilled spirits more severely than the seller of
"bonded" whiskey or of beer, wine or cider seems obvious. Aside from the fact that
the consumption of illegally distilled liquor is more likely to produce drunkenness's
than that of beer or wine or even lawfully made whiskey, and therefore involves a
greater social evil, there are other, reasons of even greater weight. It is perhaps
necessary to punish the person occasionally who sells or makes, or gives away, or
even possesses liquor of any kind. Unless the law is made in general terms prohib-
iting absolutely the use of all kinds of liquors, the difficulty of enforcing it would be
many times greater than it is today. The man therefore who makes beer is a law
violator, and hence a punishment for his act must be provided. We must examine,
however, into the nature of punishment in such cases.
Punishment of crimes is of two kinds. It is assessed as a sort of peno-correction-
al treatment for the true criminal, and it is a necessary sanction attached to police
regulations assessed against violators of those regulations who are not real criminals
at all in most instances. Life in any organized society involves for each member
thereof a certain sacrifice of his own individual wants and desires to the general
social good. The ordinary normal individual learns to live in society with a minimum
of friction by placing his desires, at any rate his lesser and temporary ones, in subju-
gation to the rules of conduct laid down by the group. Some individuals, however,
fal to develop this social mindedness. When their own wants are in conflict with
the interest of others, or with the general good, or with the rules laid down by the
group, they follow their own desires exclusively. Such egocentric personalities are
natural criminals.6 When their egocentric and anti-social activity reaches a certain
point, it becomes necessary for society to restrain their liberty and either treat
them in such a manner that they will be reformed and made to develop socially
desirable behavior habits, or, if reformation be impossible permanently, segregate
them from the remainder of the community. 41 This process ofpeno-correctional treat-
ment or complete segregation of offenders is punishment as applied in the ordinary
felony case to true criminals. Society also finds it necessary-and increasingly
necessary under the complex social and economic conditions of life in the modern
community48 to adopt many detailed rules of conduct which are often violated
by persons who are normally socially minded. An illustration will serve to clarify
this statement. In most cities there are highly complex traffic codes. While these
laws are habitually violated by professional criminals, they are also commonly
violated by persons who would shun even the thought of such crimes as murder,
rape, robbery, or arson. Yet the violator of such police regulations, whether criminal
or leading citizen of the community, must be punished. Only in this way will the
regulation be made effective, and on the effectiveness of such rules depends to a very
large degree the safety and happiness of each member in our increasingly complex
society. It is dear, however, that punishment in this sense is a very different thing
from punishment in the first sense mentioned. It proceeds from different causes,
deals with a different sort of situation, and has a different purpose.
Now without regard to one's views of the general subject of prohibition, he must
admit that there are many persons who make home brew beer, wine, cider, and other
fermented and brewed liquors, who are not in any sense professional criminals as
45. Fisher, Op. Cit., note 14.
46. Brasol, Elements of Crime, (1927) Chapt. II.
47. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, (1928), 41 Harvard Law Review, 453.
48. See the writer's discussion of this newer type of criminal law in Ely, Probable
Cause in Connection with Applications for Search Warrants, (1928) 13 St. Louis Law
Review. 101.
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we have defined that term in this discussion. It also is clear that many persons who
are not true criminals are often guilty of giving away bonded whiskey. On the
other hand, the ordinary bootlegger customarily deals in illegally manufactured dis-
tilled liquor. Now the bootlegger is a professional criminal. His very business is a
defiant violation of the expressed will of organized society, and the experience of
the writer is that in most instances the same individuals and groups who are engaged
in bootlegging are also connected with stealifhg, forging, the unlawful traffic in nar-
cotic drugs, and other forms of anti-social activity. 49 It thus seems clear that, in
a very large number of cases, punishment assessed for the manufacture, possession,
and giving away of non-distilled bonded whiskey is punishment of the second kind,
above mentioned. Punishment for making, selling, giving away, and transporting
of illegally made distilled liquor, however, is usually punishment of the first variety-
i. e. peno-correctional treatment, aimed at the true criminal.
Under an ideal scientific system of criminal procedure, in which the kind of
punishment or treatment meted out to each offender would be determined by a body
of experts, or a single expert, or even by the trial judge, no statutory distinction
between the various kinds of offenses in this regard should be made. The judge or
expert would be possessed of all of the facts of the defendant's life history, together
with a complete medical and psychological report concerning his physical condition
and behavior patterns and complexes. With this in mind he could and would fit the
treatment to the needs of the patient.5° But we do not have such a system. Punish-
ment is fixed by a jury.51 This jury is never composed of experts. It is usually com-
posed of persons having no experience in such matter whatever, and no knowledge
of the fundamentals of criminal science. Sometimes the jurors are themselves of
a low order of intelligence 2 This untrained, inexperienced body of laymen is
asked, without the aid of any knowledge of the defendant's life story, his psy-
chological and physical condition, or any of the other pertinent facts, to say what
punishment the defendant shall undergo.
In the light of these facts, no other course is open than that followed by our
legislature in most instances of establishing minute classes and gradations of offenses,
and trying to affix to each class and grade a punishment which will come somewhere
near meeting the needs of a majority of the persons who commit it.0' If this method
is applied to liquor offenses, we shall see that, in the case of the maker of home
brew or the person who gives away a drink of bonded whiskey, only such punishment
49. This point was clearly stated in the address by Mr. Lashley of the Missouri
Association for Criminal Justice in his address before the American Bar Association, 1928
meeting (not yet published).
50. Glu~ck Op. Cit., note 47 supra; Cooley, Probation and Delin tency, (1927) Chapt.
16; see also Healy, The Individual Delinquent, (1924).
51. Altho the Missouri Association for Criminal Justice has criticized the present
method of assessment of punishment there seems no immediate likelihood of a change in
the law in this regard.
52. It should be born in mind that, as a class, lawyers, doctors, school teachers, and
ministers are excluded from jury service; and that in general as a matter of practice heads
of large businesses are also excused, as are engineers whose position in the running of fac-
tories and industrial enterprises makes their absence from work detrimental to social interests.
These restrictions have taken off the jury lists a very large part of the educated portion of
the community.
53. This method has been followed in the gradation of different degrees of murder,
robbery, larceny, burglary, forgery and many other crimes. It has recently been applied
on a much more scientific basis in the proposed Italian Criminal Code drafted by Sr. Ferri.
Ferri, Relatione sul Progetto Preliminare de Codice Penale Italiano. (1921).
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is ordinarily needed as will make such person realize that he has violated the will
of society, and will lead in the future to a regard for the law, by persons who are not
by nature criminal. But in the case of the person who makes, or sells moonshine
as we have defined it, generally such punishment must be meted out as will enable the
penal departments of the state to treat and, if possible, reform a true criminal of
fixed anti-social habits of behavior and egocentric propensities. Hence the punish-
ment of the one class of offense may well be that accorded misdemeanors while that
given in the latter type of case may well be a felony punishment.
Of course such a system is arbitrary and unscientific." Some serious offenders will
be punished only for a misdemeanor and some persons who are mere occasional law
violators will be convicted of felonies. But this is a defect necessarily inherent in a
system of criminal procedure which empowers the jury to fix punishments and makes
necessary the establishment of a scale of punishments by the legislature primarily
based on the fact of the offense and not on the personality of the offender.
(b) As a second test of the practical workability of the proposed definition,
we ask if it is such as will permit experts to state positively after an analysis of
liquor submitted to them that it is moonshine. It is obvious that if a definition is
so framed that it is impossible with the aid of chemical examination of a given sub-
stance to tell whether it falls within or without the definition, prosecution under
the act would be impossible and it would be made meaningless. Applying this test
then to the definition proposed we have two major questions of analytical chemistry
involved: (1). Is it possible to distinguish brewed and fermented liquors from
distilled liquors? (2). Is it possible to distinguish illegally distilled liquors from
legally distilled liquors?
Distinguishing between brewed and fermented liquors on the one hand and
distilled liquors on the other is ordinarily an easy matter. The quantitative determi-
nation of the amount of ethyl alcohol alone is ordinarily sufficient. " But where the
supposed whiskey has been diluted or particularly strong wines are involved, this
test is not determinative of the question. Here however sugars and many other
organic compounds are found in the wines and beers which are not present in whiskey,
and the whiskey will always contain traces of fusil oil and certain organic acids.
A more difficult operation is involved in the differentiation of illegally made
distilled liquor from liquor legally distilled. However, the former is almost always
found to contain comparatively large amounts of fusil oil, while comparatively
small amounts of this substance are to be found in bonded whiskey.u In addition
the aldehydes in large quantities are found invariably in illegal whiskey whether
it be made from corn, rye, fruit, or potatoes.sn In the process of distillation these
impurities pass off at either a higher or a lower temperature than the boiling point
of ethyl alcohol and hence are found in the first and last protions of the liquors
distilled. In a bonded distillery these first and last portions of each "cooking" are
54. Glueck, Op. Cit. note 47 supra.
54a. " The difference in alcoholic contents mentioned between fermented or brewed
liquors on the one hand and whiskey for distilled liquors on theother can not be detected
by the use of a hydrameter since the presence of sugars in the fermented and brewed liquors
prevents this test from being accurate and in fact usually prevents it from being used at
all. The alcoholic percentages in these cases must be determined by a process of distillation
and for great accuracy the analysis should be gravametric.
55. Note 13 supra.
56. The amounts of these compounds to be found in bonded whiskeys of various
kinds are set out in Woodman, Op. Cit note 13 supra. It would be of great value for those
connected with the enforcement of state prohibition if careful research were made to deter-
mine the amounts of these substances usually found in "moonshine".
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discarded and only that portion which is largely free from impurities is used.37 In
addition the whiskey thus obtained is aged for long periods of time in charred barrels.
This process serves to further purify it.58 The presence of these impurities in large
quantities is therefore positively determinative that the liquor has been illegally
manufactured, i. e., that it is moonshine in accordance with the proposed definition.
IV.
It has recently been suggested that moonshine can only be applied to "whiskey";
that whiskey has always been understood as referring to liquor made from grains
as distinguished from liquor made from fruit or other substances; and that therefore
moonshine must always be made from grains. In support of this theory it is
argued that liquor made from fruit never contains fusil oil; that fusil oil is the poison-
ous substance which produces the so called "hootch" poisoning; and that the
reason for making the selling of moonshine a felony was to stop the sale of this
dangerous substance5 9
The term whiskey was before prohibition variously used in different parts of the
country and in different foreign countries. But at any rate, to base an argument
upon its meaning at that time is to go back to the old fallacious logic of concepts.
Science today realizes that terms are only mathematical symbols.A0 They are like
the figures of arithmetic or the letters of algebra. So long as, in a single discussion,
we invariably use the terms in one sense, and so long as it is plain at the outset
what particular physical facts the terms are going to represent in our discussion,
it makes very little difference if we have departed from the meaning usually assigned
to the terms.
The argument based on the absence of fusil oil sounds at first more convincing.
As a matter of fact, however, it is not the fusil oil which makes liquor poisonous. 01
At most the fusil oil has a tendency to nauseate and nothing more. Some authori-
ties state that hootch poisoning is nothing more than alcohol poisoning. But in any
event the aldehydes present in illegally distilled liquor, whether produced from corn
or fruit or any other prime material, are highly poisonous. 2
Finally the great trouble with this theory is that it does not fit the decisions of
the courts. The Vesper case e. g.63 cannot be explained on this ground. Here rubbing
alcohol which might have been made originally from fruit, grain, potatoes, rice or any
number of different things, and about whose manufacture we actually know nothing
57. This process is known as fractional distillation. But even where it is not used by
a careful controlling of temperature and other conditions, the whiskey is kept relatively
pure, and unduly large amounts of the "secondary" constitutents are prevented from getting
into it.
58. This process serves to remove pyrol alcohol which is said to give "raw" whiskey
its unpleasant taste.
59. This argument was made by counsel for the defendant in the recent case of State
v. Harris (Circuit Court of Marion County, May Term 1928, now pending on appeal to the
Supreme Court.)
60. See note 9 supra
61. It is the fusil oil which gives flavor to whiskey. This substance, when taken in
only small amount, as in bonded whiskey, produces no known toxic effect. In large amounts
it will produce nausea.
62. The symptoms of so called "hootch poisoning" are those ordinarily found after
the aldehydes have been taken: at least the writer has been so informed by friends in the
medical profession.
63. Note 31 supra.
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as far as the evidence in the case goes, was distilled, and a'potable liquor produced.
The court without hesitation held it to be moonshine.
It is submitted that the suggested definition of moonshine as a distilled liquor
which has been made without lawful authority from the Federal and State govern-
ments, is clearly consistent with all of the Missouri cases except those which the
court itself has plainly overruled; and that it embodies a wise social policy and is
practically workable. It is believed that an attempt to elaborate the definition
further would only lead to difficulties, and that the statement of Judge Walker
in the last case, State v. Cook, should be taken as the final crystallization of the law.
Ben Ely, Jr.*
Hannibal, Mo.
*Mr. Ely is a member of the Hannibal Missouri, Bar, and a graduate of the School of Law
of the University of Missouri, class of 1922.

